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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
DESERET COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
JSJ CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

Case No. 16992

* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was originally brought by Appellant, Deseret
Company, to recover money paid -and to obtain removal from
Appellant's premises of an allegedly defective custom-made
pharmaceuticals packaging machine, manufactured by Respondent
for Appellant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent was served with the Complaint in this case at
its offices in Grand Haven, Michigan.

Respondent thereupon

moved to quash service of process and/or dismiss the Complaint.
Hearing upon the motion was held on January 25, 1980 at which
time Appellant was allowed an opportunity to produce an
additional counter-affidavit relating to the jurisdictional
issues.

Thereafter, Appellant supplied the court with the
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requested affidavit and on February 19, 1980 the court granted
Respondent's motion to quash service of process and dismiss the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the Respondent based on
the Court's finding that:
[T]his was a single isolated transaction,
initiated originally by plaintiff's
[Appellant's] telephone call based upon
the single ad in a trade journal.
In my
opinion these facts do not warrant a finding
that the "minimal contacts" requirements of
due process have been met.
(Record on
Appeal at 63)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent JSJ Corporation seeks to have the
Order dismissing the Complaint and quashing service of process
for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not believe that all of the material facts
pertinent to this particular matter have been set forth in the
Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief.

Rather than attempt to

just set forth omitted facts which Respondent believes are
material the following Statement of Facts is provided by the
Respondent.
Appellant, Deseret Company (plaintiff below), is a Delaware
Corporation authorized to do business and doing business in Utah
including at a facility in Sandy, Utah.

Respondent, JSJ Corpora-

tion (defendant below), is a Delaware corporation with its
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principal place of business in Grand Haven, Michigan.

It is not

qualified or authorized to do business in Utah, and has no
offices, factories, warehouses or other places of business in
Utah.

Respondent has no telephone listing, bank account,

inventory, files, books of account, facilities, investments or
other real or personal property in the State of Utah.

It has no

employees or salesmen working in the State of Utah on a regular
basis.

(Affidavit of Paul A. Johnson, Record on Appeal

at 14-15).
In late 1974 or early 1975, Respondent advertised in
certain trade journals, none of which were directed specifically
to the State of Utah.
Appeal at 50).

{Affidavit of Lee S. Kihnke, Record on

Mr. George Ford was a former employee of

Appellant and was charged with the responsibility of acquiring a
packaging machine for the processing of some of Appellant's
products.

In seeking a manufacturer for such a machine he

reviewed trade journals and noted an advertisement by Respondent
as a manufacturer of packaging machines.

Ford thereupon con-

tacted Respondent's Michigan office stating that Appellant may
be interested in ordering and developing a custom-made pharmaceuticals packaging machine.
on Appeal at 59-60) .
machine before.

(Affidavit of George Ford, Record

Respondent had not manufactured such a

Consequently, Mr. Kihnke, general manager of

Dake Corporation, Packaging and Machinery Division of JSJ
Corporation, traveled to Utah to discuss Appellant's needs and

-3-
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the development and production of such a machine.

Nothing came

of these contacts, as Appellant acquired a machine from another
source.

Thereafter, Mr. George Ford left the employ of the

Appellant.

(Affidavit of George Ford, Record on Appeal at 60;

Affidavit of Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 53,54).

Nearly

two years later, on March 29, 1977, Appellant mailed to Respondent
at Grand Haven, Michigan, samples of the packaging materials and
specifications for a new machine.

Respondent replied with a

proposal, contained in a letter dated April 6, 1977.

On August

10, 1977, a second letter was sent by Respondent JSJ requoting
its bid for the machinery.

On November 8, 1977, Appellant sent

adqitional packaging samples and specifications and requested a
bid on a machine as soon as possible.

Respondent replied with a

second revised proposal based on the new samples and specif ications, on November 29, 1977, which included, inter alia, the
following conditions of sale:
3. Acceptance. No order, sale, agreement
for sale, accepted proposal, offer to sell
and/or contract of sale shall be binding upon
Dake unless accepted by an officer of Dake
at its office in the City of Grand Haven,
Ottawa County, Michigan on an order acknowledgement letter.
6. Shipment: Shipments are made F.O.B.
Dake's plant of manufacture.

* * *
18. Law: The rights and duties of all
persons and the construction and effect of
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all provisions hereof shall be governed by
and construed according to the laws of
Michigan.
(Emphasis added) (Affidavit of
Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 54-55).
On February 17, 1978, Appellant mailed to Respondent in
Grand Haven Michigan, a Purchase Order agreeing to the terms of
Respondent's order proposal of November 29, 1977, with certain
stated exceptions, which order was accepted by Respondent in
Michigan.
1978.

The acceptance was confirmed by letter of February 17,

Appellant sent a truck to pick up the completed machinery

at Respondent's plant in Grand Haven, Michigan on August 16,
1978.

(Affidavit of Lee

s.

Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 54-55).

Installation was supervised by one of Respondent's
employees who came to Utah for that purpose.

The machine

allegedly did not function properly and in November 1978 two of
Respondent's employees came to Utah and spent four days working
on the machine.

(Affidavit of James

c.

Loveless, Record on

Appeal at 39-40).
Respondent's negotiations with Deseret and production of
the pharmaceuticals packaging machine were the direct result of
Appellant's inquiry and requests for bids.

(Affidavit of

Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 55).
Appellant filed this action in Utah alleging, inter alia,
that the machine is "defective and inoperative", that it has not
and will not "operate according to the specifications in the
sale documents" and that defendant has "breached the agreement

-5-
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of sale by supplying a packaging machine which will not perform
the functions for which it was designed and sold to plaintiff in
violation of express and implied warranties of salen.

As to

jurisdictional facts Appellant's Complaint merely states the
conclusion that:
Defendant has transacted business and is
doing business in the State of Utah pursuant
to the applicable provisions of the Utah
"long arm" statute, and is subject to the
jurisdiction of the above-entitled court.
(See Complaint, Record on Appeal at 2-3).
Respondent, by special appearance, demonstrated through
affidavit, memoranda and oral argument, to the satisfaction of
the lower court that it in fact was not doing business or
transacting business within the State and was not otherwise
amenable to long-arm jurisdiction inasmuch as it did not have
"minimum contacts" with Utah sufficient to satisfy due process.
From the ruling of the trial court to that effect, Appellant
prosecutes this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESPONDENT DO NOT
CONSTITUTE "DOING BUSINESS" IN THE
STATE OF UTAH AND ARE NOT SUFFICIENT
FOR IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION ON THAT BASIS
While Appellant in its Complaint suggests that Respondent
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in Utah because it
is doing business in the State, it does not pursue this basis
of jurisdiction on appeal.

Respondent agrees that under the

-6-
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"solicitation plus" test which this Court has developed and the
extensive contacts with the forum that are necessary to constitute "doing business" in Utah, the facts of this case clearly
demonstrate that Respondent is not doing business in Utah and is
not subject to jurisdiction on that basis.

See, Burt Drilling,

Inc. v. Pacific Hydro Corp., 608 P.2d 294 (Utah 1980).
POINT II
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESPONDENT
DO NOT SATISFY THE GROUNDS
DELINEATED IN THE UTAH LONG-ARM
STATUTE WHICH ARE ALLEGED AND/OR
RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT
Assertion of jurisdiction under the Utah Long-Arm Statute,
Utah Code Ann., §§78-27-22 to -28 (1953), involves two elements.
First, the non-resident's activities within the State must
satisfy one of the ~rounds delineated in the statute for
assertion of jurisdiction and the cause of action must arise out
of such contacts.

Secondly, the exercise of jurisdiction must

meet due process, minimum contacts requirements.
In Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578
P.2d 850 (Utah 1978) this Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated:
[T]he long-arm statute can be invoked only
if there are allegations that one or more
of the enumerated acts therein obtain.
(Emphasis added) .
The plaintiff in that case alleged that its claims arose from
the transaction of business, contracting to supply services or
goods and breach of warranty.

In its Complaint, the Appellant
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in this case asserts Respondent is subject to jurisdiction
because it was involved in the "transaction of business" and
was "doing business" in the State.

On appeal, Appellant has

gone beyond the scope of its pleadings and suggests that jurisdiction may also be based on the long-arm grounds of contracting
to supply services or goods in Utah or causing injury within
Utah by breach of warranty.
Respondent submits that it is not transacting business
within the State, as more fully discussed below, and that the
other bases for assertion of long-arm jurisdiction are not
appropriately before the Court for consideration.

However,

assuming, arguendo, that these other grounds raised by Appellant's
brief are appropriate for consideration, Respondent submits that
the facts of this case do not justify their application.

A. Respondent Did Not Transact
Business Within the State of Utah
Utah Code Ann., §78-27-23,

(1953), defines "transaction of

business within this State" as follows:
Activities of a nonresident person, his agents
or representatives in this state which affect
persons or businesses within the State of Utah.
(Emphasis added) .
Appellant claims that this standard is met by Respondent by
corning here to solicit Appellant's business, by communicating
with Appellant by telephone and through the mails, by selling

-8-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant a machine worth approximately $90,000.00, knowing that

it would be used in Utah, and by sending its employees and representatives here to install, service and attempt to repair the
machine.
As set forth in the statement of facts, Respondent traveled
to Utah in response to Appellant's solicitation.

Moreover, no

contract was entered into as a result of that visit.

The communi-

cations and telephone conversations, and the consummating of the
contract in Michigan obviously do not involve activities or
presence of Respondent, its agents or representatives in Utah.
Finally, even if the installation and subsequent service work by
Respondent in Utah were sufficient to constitute the transaction
of business in the State, they are not the activities which give
rise and/or result in Appellant's claim.

Appellant has not

alleged any breach of the installation contract.

Rather, the

claim goes to the design and manufacture of the machinery which
occurred in Michigan.

Clearly under the statutory standard,

Respondent did not transact business in the State of Utah.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in Burt Drilling,
Inc., supra, sustained the decision that Pacific Hydro was
amenable to jurisdiction only on the long-arm basis of "causing
any injury within this State whether tortious or by breach of
warranty".

This he did because in precedential long-arm juris-

diction cases involving causes of action based on the transaction
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of business within the State, the Supreme Court had "found the
necessary significant minimal contacts on the basis of more than
a single act performed within the State".

In the instant case,

Respondent submits that it has not transacted any business in
this State giving rise to this cause of action, much less does it
have a multiplicity of acts within this State as required by Utah
decisional law.
B.

Appellant's Cause of Action Does Not Arise
Out of Respondent's Contracting to
Supply Services in the State

Appellant did not plead Respondent's contracting to supply
services in the State as a basis for jurisdiction and therefore
this basis of long-arm jurisdiction should not be relied upon
on appeal.

But even assuming, arguendo, that the Court may

consider this ground of jurisdiction, it is not appropriate
under the facts of this case.
In its brief, Appellant asserts that:
[Respondent's] actions fall within this provision of the Long-Arm Statute, [contracting to
supply services or goods in this State] . . .
because it contracted to provide a factory
trained service technician to supervise the
installation of the machine in Utah which
plaintiff purchased from defendant.
The
installation was plainly a service and the
contract to provide such a service in Utah
places defendant squarely within the ambit of
the Long-Arm Statute.
(Brief of Appellant at 3-4).

As noted in Appellant's Statement

of Facts, the "Dake Installation Policy" was a separate document,
independent of the contract proposal to sell and manufacture
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the machinery which is in issue herein.

Even if the installa-

tion policy is considered a contract for services in the State,
Appellant's Complaint does not allege any breach of the
installation contract, or warranties related thereto, or any
defective or negligent installation.

Rather, Appellant seeks to

rescind the contract for sale and manufacture of the machinery
and recover its money paid thereon based on Respondent's alleged
breach of the contract by providing defective machinery or by
breaching implied warranties of sale and manufacture.
In the recent case of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc.,
No. 15987 (Utah, April 11, 1980) this Court reaffirmed its
position that in actions brought pursuant to the long-arm Statute
the "plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of some contact
defendant has with the forum State."

The Court declined the

invitation to extend this requirement to embrace claims sued on
which have a "nexus" with, but do not arise out of a defendant's
activities within the forum or claims which have a "close relationship" with the non-resident defendant's jurisdictional
activities.

(Slip Opinion at 13-14).

Respondent submits that in the instant case just as in
Roskelly, supra, ''it does not here assist the plaintiff to show
the contacts the defendant has with the forum if the specific
litigation at bar does not arise out of any of those contacts".
(Slip. Opinion at 5).
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In Roskelly, supra, the cause of action was based on an
alleged contract for commissions on the sale of certain equipment ultimately to a Utah corporation.

The Court found that

though the defendant's contacts with the State in being present
to oversee the installation of the equipment may be sufficient
for jurisdiction if the litigation involved an action for breach
of warranty or negligence in installing the equipment, the
plaintiff could not avail himself of such contacts for the
purpose of his claim on an entirely different contract.

Likewise,

in the case at bar, Appellant's claim is based on an entirely
different contract (manufacture and sale) than the one which
resulted in Respondent's contact with the forum (installation),
or at best a completely separate phase and aspect of the same
contract, and such contact is thus not available to Appellant to
support a claim of jurisdiction in this action.

c.

Respondent Did Not Contract
To Provide Goods in Utah

This basis of long-arm jurisdiction also was not alleged
in Appellant's Complaint and is not properly before the Court.
But even assuming, arguendo, that consideration is appropriate
Appellant has not specifically relied on this basis of jurisdiction and the facts do not warrant its application.
As is discussed in the Statement of Facts, Appellant and
Respondent entered a contract negotiated by mail and telephone
which contract was accepted by Respondent and therefore
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consummated at Respondent's place of business in Michtgan, as
per the contract provisions.

Thus, the contracting to supply

goods did not occur in Utah.

Moreover, the contract did not

call for the supplying of goods in Utah.

Rather, Respondent was

to manufacture the machinery in Michigan and hold the machinery
there for pickup by Appellant.
the Appellant in Michigan.

Thus, the goods were supplied to

Moreover, Appellant does not appear

to claim jurisdiction based on contracting to supply goods in
the State.

Rather, Appellant bases its claim for jurisdiction

on Respondent's contracting to provide services in the State of
Utah, apparently acknowledging that there must be some activity
within the State for long-arm jurisdiction to obtain.
Just as in the case of long-arm jurisdiction based on the
transaction of business in the State, Justice Stewart in Burt
Drilling Corp., supra, summarized Utah precedent as requiring
more than a single act performed in the State in order to
satisfy the necessary significant minimal contacts necessary
to invoke jurisdiction in causes of action arising out of
the contracting to supply services or goods in the State.
In the instant case Respondent submits that it has not
contracted to supply goods in Utah nor done any act, much less
several acts in contracting to supply goods, in the State as
required by Utah decisional law.
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D. Respondent Did Not Cause Injury
Within this State Whether Tortious
Or by Breach of Warranty
Again, this provision of the long-arm statute is not
invoked by Appellant's Complaint and cannot be relied on by
Apellant here.

In any event, this basis of jurisdiction is

not supported by the facts.
Appellant's Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Respondent
"breached the Agreement of Sale by supplying a packaging machine
which will not perform the functions for which it was designed
and sold to plaintiff in violation of express and implied
warranties of sale'', and that the machine is "totally defective
and inoperative".
Appellant does not recite these charges in support of a
product's liability claim, or a claim for damages for breach of
warranty.

Rather, Appellant makes these allegations to support

its theory of breach of contract and its prayer for recission
and restitution.
Respondent submits that this cause of action for recission
and restitution is not a claim for "injury" caused by breach of
warranty.

Moreover, this Court has recognized that "financial

injury" which occurs in Utah to a Utah plaintiff as the result
of alleged wrongdoing outside of the State is not a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction.

See, Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats

and Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972); Burt
Drilling Corp.,

(Stewart J. concurring), supra, at 9.

A

contrary result would allow assertion of jurisdiction over a
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

non-resident in any forum in which a plaintiff may locate.

Such

would clearly be an abuse of long-arm jurisdiction.
Respondent submits that scrutiny of Appellant's Complaint
demonstrates that it is not based on "injury within the state by
breach of warranty" as that phrase has been construed by Utah
Courts.

Plaintiff is suing for rescission not for damages.

Even

assuming plaintiffs' claim could be construed to allege injury,
it is clear that such injury would only be financial in nature.
POINT III
ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION
OVER RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE
WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66

s.

Ct. 154 (1945) laid down a new

test regarding a State's jurisdiction of nonresidents.

That test

provided that to obtain in personam jurisdiction of a defendant,
the due process clause requires "certain minimum contacts" within
the forum and that the maintenance of the suit does not "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".

The

Court added that these demands of due proces·s "may be met by such
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make
it reasonable in the context of our federal system of government
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there."
The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958) warned that it is a
mistake to assume that International Shoe and its progeny
"herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
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jurisdiction of state courts".

The Court also stated that the

application of the "minimum contacts" rule will vary with the
quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but that it is
essential in each case "that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus, invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.n

(Emphasis added).

There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions which
have held that activities parallel to those in the instant case
were insufficient to meet the due process limitations
ennunciated by the United States Supreme Court.

In Saletko

v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962),
the plaintiff sued for breach of a foreign corporation's contractual promise to sell and deliver certain auto parts.

The

Court held that the defendant was not subject to jurisdiction as
it never was physically present in Illinois (the forum)

and the

parts were delivered outside of Illinois to a trucking company
(agent of the purchaser) for shipment to the purchaser.

Like-

wise, in Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (D.Ill. 1959), a
non-resident seller's motion to quash was granted where the only
contacts the seller had with Illinois were that the plaintiff's
telephone order was made from Illinois, the goods were shipped
c.o.d. to Illinois, and payment was made from Illinois and
received in Tennessee.

The defendant was never physically

present in Illinois and had no agent there.
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Due process was held to prohibit assertion of jurisdiction
in Chassis-Trak, Inc. v. Federated Purchaser, Inc., 179 F. Supp.
780 (D.N.J. 1960).

The case involved a single business trans-

action in which all pertinent negotiations, including the
purchase order were by mail and telephone.
The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction in Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc.

v. Mitchell, 44 Misc. 2d 68 7, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679, aff'd, 219
N.E.2d 868 (1961), where the contract was executed in Ohio and
the defendant did nothing in New York (the forum) as regards the
plaintiff's cause of action, except deliver the materials
involved.

In addition, a single conversation had taken place in

New York more than a month before the Ohio contract was
executed.
In Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), the plaintiff placed an order with the
defendant, a non-resident manufacturer, which order was accepted
at defendant's plant in New York.
the seller's plant in New York.

The goods were sold f .o.b.
After receipt of the shipment,

plaintiff complained that the goods were defective.
several communications between the parties.

There were

The defendant's

manager went to the forum to discuss the complaint.

The court

rejected the argument that a single interstate shipment and the
presence of the defendant in the state to discuss the claim
constituted minimum contacts.
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The defendant in AMCO Transworld, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257
F. Supp. 215 (D.Tex. 1966), a French corporation, accepted
purchase orders in France, mailed notice of acceptance to the
plaintiff, shipped the goods to Texas, and received payment by
issuing drafts drawn on a Texas bank.

The defendant's

commercial director had made two trips to Texas prior to the
execution of this contract and solicited business there without
achieving the consummation of the contracts within the state.
The Court held that these activities did not satisfy the minimum
contacts test.
In the present case, Appellant saw an advertisement of the
Respondent's.

That advertisement was not specifically directed

to Appellant or Utah, but rather appeared in a trade journal.
The specific relationship between the parties was initiated by
Appellant when its employee contacted Respondent by telephone.
In response to Appellant's inquiry, Respondent's employee came
to Utah.

No contract was consummated in Utah and nothing came

of this visit.

Appellant purchased the machine it was then

seeking from another companyo

Clearly, plaintiff's subsequent

purchase of a different machine and its resulting alleged cause
of action did not arise from the Respondent's trip to the forum.
The contract which is the basis of this lawsuit was with-

out doubt initiated by Appellant when it sent samples and specifications to Respondent and requested a bid.

At this time
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it is interesting to note that Appellant's employee who had
originally seen Respondent's advertisement and who suggested that
Respondent manufacture the first machine, had left the company.
Conununications by telephone and mail resulted in the consummation
of the contract finally in Michigan.

Respondent performed the

contract at issue in this case in Michigan, inasmuch as the
machinery was manufactured there and was sold and turned over to
Appellant there.
to Utah.

Appellants then had a truck take the machinery

Respondent's installation of the machinery in Utah, as

discussed above, does not involve a contact with Utah pertinent
to this litigation.

Respondent's other trips to Utah in response

to Appellant's claim that the machinery was defective, to make
adjustments and hopefully resolve or settle the matter, are not
available to Appellant to show contacts with the State as
Appellant's cause of action does not arise out of such contacts.
A contrary result, allowing contacts which occur after the alleged
cause of action has arisen, made in an effort to work the situation
out, to be used by Appellant to support its claim of jurisdiction
is clearly not contemplated by the long-arm statute.
Appellant's claim arises out of the isolated sale and manufacture of machinery which was ultimately located in Utah.

The

record clearly indicates that Respondent was not qualified to do
business in Utah, does not maintain offices, factories, warehouses or other places of business in Utah, has no telephone

-19-
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listing, bank accounts, inventory, books of account, facilities
or other files, real or personal property in the state.
Appellant suggests that recent decisions announced by this
Court require the exercise of jurisdiction of the Respondent in
this case.

Respondent submits that these cases are distinguishable

from the instant case and that the principles ennunciated therein
demonstrate that a finding of jurisdiction in this case would
violate due process.
Burt Drilling, Inc., supra, differs from the present case in
that the record there clearly indicated that the defendant was a
nationwide, multistate business and consequently should reasonably
expect to be required to defend suits in foreign forums.

Appellant

cannot rely on this argument in the instant case as there is
nothing in the record that treats this beyond the fact of some
trade journal advertising in late 1974 or early 1975.

Moreover,

in Burt Drilling, Inc., supra, the Court made reference to the
fact that the defendant had a security interest in the machinery
located in Utah, thereby invoking the protection of Utah law.
Consequently, the Court felt it would be fair to require the
defendant to be subject to jurisdiction in Utah.

There is no

evidence in this case that Respondent had such a security interest.
Finally, the plurality holding in Burt Drilling, Inc., supra; was
that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction on the basis of
causing injury in the State.

The injury in that case consisted

of the fact that the equipment failed to operate properly causing
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plaintiff to lose drilling contracts, and resulting in loss of
some of the machinery parts which fell into a well casing and
could not be removed.

Justice Stewart characterized the injury

as tortious injury in the State and distinguished it from the
financial injury in the State alleged in Hydro-Swift Corp. v.
Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., and which allegedly exists in the
present case, which was held to be insufficient contact with the
State to satisfy due process.
In Roskelly & Co., supra, this Court ordered the lower court
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In reaching this decision the Court noted as relevant the fact
that the specific contacts between the parties were initiated by
the plaintiff's telephone call from Utah to the defendant, just
as they were in the instant case.

The record apparently does not

demonstrate how plaintiff came to· be acquainted with defendant -whether by advertisement, prior business dealings, or otherwise.
The Court focused on the direct contact between the parties
initiated by plaintiff's telephone call.

Also of significance to

the Court was the fact that the defendant entered Utah only for
the purpose of supervising the installation of the equipment it
had sold.

The Court held that this contact would be significant

if suit were brought based on negligence or breach of warranty in
installing the equipment, but that it had no relevance in a suit
on an entirely different contract.
the instant case.

The same situation obtains in

Finally, the Court also noted with interest

that the defendant in that case, like the Respondent in this
case, was not qualified to do business in Utah.
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In Ted R. Brown and Associates v. Carnes Corp., No. 15978
(Utah April 24, 1980) jurisdiction of a foreign corporation was
determined to be appropriate.

The foreign corporation in that

case, however, had local sales representatives who were under
contract in the State of Utah, and had a substantial volume of
business in the State.

Through these agents the corporation

received orders for sales of its goods and supplied those goods
in the State seeking the benefits of the Utah market.

In the

particular transaction in issue in that case representatives of
the foreign corporation came to Utah and combined their efforts
with the local sales representative to sell their product, make
adaptations thereof to satisfy the purchaser's needs and to
install it.

Plaintiff, a sales representative, sued for its

conunission due from this sale.
In the instant case, Respondent does not have the substantial activities in the forum that Carnes Corporation had.
has no local sales representatives.

It

It did not negotiate or

consununate the contract in issue here in Utah.

There is no

evidence in the record that it had the volume of business within
Utah that Carnes Corporation enjoyed.
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Brown, Nos. 15530 and
15544.

(Utah, Mar. 6, 1980) defendant not only contracted to

sell goods to a Utah buyer but contracted to deliver the goods
in Utah, unlike Respondent here who supplied the machinery to the
Appellant in Michigan.

This was considered to be a purposeful
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contact with the State whereby the defendant availed himself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the State.
In its brief Appellant notes that the Mallory decision
requires a balancing of the interest and inconveniences of the
parties as part of the due process inquiry.

However, contrary to

Appellant's suggestion, in the due process balancing of inconveniences, risk of default by the defendant is not the only
consideration in the equation.

Another factor is whether the

defendant is a multistate or local manufacturer or business.
Except for the fact of Respondent's advertising in general trade
journals in 1974 and 1975, plaintiff has not established in the
record before the Court the interstate sweep of Respondent's
business.

The instant transaction was consummated

and performed all at Respondent's place of business in Michigan.
The Mallory Court did note, however, that even the operation of
interstate business alone cannot justify personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant.

Finally, while the machine is

located in Utah and inspection thereof may have some value,
Appellant's action is based on the machine's failure to perform
according to contract specifications and warranties.
machine was developed and custom made in Michigan.

The
All of the

witnesses with knowledge of the manufacture are located in
Michigan.
While utah may have an interest in providing a forum to its
residents to seek redress against non-residents, due process
cannot be violated in so doing.
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CONCLUSION

Respondent is not doing business in Utah.

Hence it may be

subject to jurisdiction in the State only if it has activities
within the state that satisfy the long-arm statute, the cause of
action specifically arises out of those specific activities, and
exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process.

Respondent

submits that it did not transact business in the State, contract
to provide goods in the State or cause injury in the State as
those terms are given content by Utah cases, and that Respondent's
activities in the forum, if any, did not give rise to the
present cause of action.
Assertion of jurisdiction in this case would offend due
process requirements as recognized in cases from other jurisdictions.

Moreover, recent Utah cases which have upheld the

application of long-arm jurisdiction are distinguishable from
the present case, and the principles recently ennunciated by
this Court demonstrate that a finding of jurisdiction in this
case would violate due process.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~~~
GIFFotID

) .' 1980.

~· PRICE~-

LISA M.'PEARSON
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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